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Biology helps you to win a game
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We present a game of interating agents whih mimis the omplex dynamis found in many
natural and soial systems. These agents modify their strategies periodially, depending on their
performanes using geneti rossover mehanisms, inspired by biology. We study the performanes
of the agents under dierent onditions, and how they adapt themselves. In addition the dynamis
of the game is investigated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Is the survival of the ttest priniple limited to biol-
ogy only? Perhaps not and there ould be other spheres
of life in whih this priniple is appliable. Competition
plays a key role and in order to ompete and thus survive
in any environment or situation, one primarily needs to
adapt in order to sueed. Then what is adaptation and
evolution? Adaptation is an alteration or adjustment in
struture or habits, often hereditary, by whih a speies
or individual improves its ondition in relationship to its
environment. Evolution is the hange in the geneti om-
position of a population during suessive generations, as
a result of natural seletion ating on the geneti varia-
tion among individuals, and resulting in the development
of a new speies. Here, we show that in the behaviour
of various omplex systems found in natural and soial
environments [1, 2, 3, 4, 5℄, that an be haraterized
by the ompetition among interating agents for sare
resoures, adaptation to the environment plays a very
important role.
These agents ould be diverse in form and in apa-
bility, ranging for example, from arinogeni ells in the
human body to multinational rms in the global nanial
market. In these dynamially evolving omplex systems
the nature of agents and their behaviour dier a lot but
they have a ommon underlying mehanism. In order to
have a deeper understanding of the interations of the
large number of agents, one should rst onsider the in-
dividual apabilities of the agents. Its behaviour may be
thought of as a olletion of simple rules governing re-
sponses to numerous stimuli. The rules of ation serve
as the agents' strategies, and the behaviour of an agent is
the rules ating sequentially. Therefore, in order to model
any omplex dynamially adaptive system, a major on-
ern is the seletion and representation of the stimuli and
responses, sine the behaviour and strategies of the om-
ponent agents are determined thereby. Then the agent
needs to adapt to dierent situations, where the experi-
ene of an agent guides it to hange its struture so that
∗
Eletroni address: anirbanle.hut.;
URL: http://www.le.hut.fi/~anirban
as time passes, the agent learns to make better use of the
environment for its own benet. However, the timesales
over whih the agents adapt vary from one individual to
another and also from one system to another.
In omplex adaptive systems, many interesting tempo-
ral patterns are produed, sine a major part of the en-
vironment of a partiular agent inludes other adaptive
agents and a onsiderable amount of agent's eort goes
in adaptation and reation to the other agents. Thus the
situation is onsiderably dierent and more ompliated
than in game theory [6℄ and onventional theories in eo-
nomis, where the study is of patterns in behavioural
equilibrium that indue no further interation.
In this paper, we study a simple game based on the
basi minority game [7, 8, 9, 10, 11℄, where the agents
adapt themselves by modifying their strategies from time
to time, depending on their urrent performanes, using
geneti rossover mehanisms [12, 13, 14, 15℄. The game
an be a very simple representation of a omplex adap-
tive system. We make a omparative study of their per-
formanes with the various mehanisms and in a test
situation.
II. MODEL
In this setion we give a brief desription of the model.
The basi minority game onsists of an odd number N of
agents who an perform at a given time t, any of the two
possible ations denoted here by 0 or 1. The minority
game was based on the El Farol bar problem, reated by
Brian Arthur, in whih a population of agents have to
deide whether to go to the bar every Thursday night,
and so there were two possible ations to attend de-
noted by 1 and not to attend denoted by 0, depending
on whether the bar was too rowded or not [5℄. An agent
wins the game if it is one of the members of the minor-
ity group. All the agents are assumed to have aess
to nite amount of global information: a ommon bit-
string memory of the M most reent outomes. With
this there are 2M possible history bit-strings. Now, a
strategy onsists of two possible responses, whih in the
binary sense are an ation 0 or ation 1 to eah possible
history bit-strings. Thus, there are 22
M
possible strate-
gies onstituting the whole strategy spae.
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Figure 1: Plots of (a) attendane and (b) performane of the
players for the basi minority game with N = 801, M = 6,
k = 10 and T = 5000.
Eah time the game has been played, time t is inre-
mented by unity and one virtual point is assigned to
the strategies that predited the orret outome and
the best strategy is the one whih has the highest virtual
point sore. The performane of a player is measured by
the number of times the player wins, and the strategy,
whih the player uses to win, gets a real point. The
number of agents who have hosen a partiular ation,
say 1 whih represents to attend, is denoted by A1(t)
(also referred as attendane) and it varies with time.
We have plotted the attendane and performane for the
basi minority game in Fig. 1.
Now we dene the total utility of the system as the
number of persons in the minority group at a given time
t. For onveniene, we mathematially dene a saled
utility (total utility/maximum utility) as
U = [(1−θ(xt−xM ))xt+θ(xt−xM )(N −xt)]/xM , (1)
where xM = (N − 1)/2, xt is either equal to A1(t) or
A0(t), and Θ(x) is Heaviside step funtion:
θ(x) =
{
0 when x ≤ 0
1 when x > 0.
The players examine their performanes after every
time interval τ . If a player nds that he is among the
fration n (where 0 < n < 1) who are the worst perform-
ing players, he adapts himself and modies his strategies.
The mehanism by whih the player reates new strate-
gies is geneti rossover, whereby he selets the two par-
ents from his pool of k strategies and reates two new
hildren [14, 15℄, as desribed in Fig. 2.
If the parents are hosen randomly from the pool of
strategies then the mehanism represents a one-point
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Figure 2: Shemati diagram to illustrate the mehanism of
one-point geneti rossover for produing new strategies. The
strategies si and sj are the parents. We hoose the breaking
point randomly and through this one-point geneti rossover,
the hildren sk and sl are produed.
geneti rossover and if the parents are the best strate-
gies then the mehanism represents a hybridized geneti
rossover. The hildren may replae parents or two
worst strategies and aordingly four dierent interest-
ing ases arise: (a) one-point geneti rossover with par-
ents killed, i.e. parents are replaed by the hildren,
(b) one-point geneti rossover with parents saved, i.e.
the two worst strategies are replaed by the hildren but
the parents are retained, () hybridized geneti rossover
with parents killed and (d) hybridized geneti rossover
with parents saved.
It should be noted that the mehanism of evolution
of strategies is onsiderably dierent from earlier at-
tempts [7, 16, 17℄. This is beause in this mehanism
the strategies are hanged by the agents themselves and
even though the strategy spae evolves ontinuously, its
size and dimensionality remain the same.
The Hamming distane dH between two bit-strings is
dened as the ratio of the number of unommon bits to
the total length of the bit strings. It is a measure of the
orrelation between two strategies:
dH =


0 orrelated
0.5 unorrelated
1 anti-orrelated
whih an be plotted as the game evolves.
III. RESULTS
In order to determine whih mehanism is the most
eient, we have made a omparative study of the four
ases, mentioned earlier. We plot the attendane as a
funtion of time for the dierent mehanisms in Fig. 3.
In Fig. 4 we show the total utility of the system in eah
of the ases (a)-(d), where we have plotted results of the
average over 100 runs and eah point in the utility urve
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Figure 3: Plots of the attendanes by hoosing parents ran-
domly (a) and (b), and using the best parents in a player's
pool () and (d). In (a) and () ase parents are replaed
by hildren and in (b) and (d) ase hildren replae the two
worst strategies. Simulations have been done with N = 801,
M = 6, k = 16, t = 40, n = 0.4 and T = 10000.
represents a time average taken over a bin of length 50
time-steps. The simulation time is doubled from those
in Fig. 3, in order to expose the asymptoti behaviour
better. On the basis of Figs. 3 and 4, we nd that the
ase (d) is the most eient.
In Fig. 5 (a) one an see the evolution of the average
Hamming distane of all the strategies of a player in a
game, where the player adapts using one-point geneti
rossover and the two worst strategies are replaed by
the hildren and the parents are also saved. It should be
noted that the Hamming distane an hange only when
the worst strategies are replaed by the hildren and the
parents are saved, where the bits in a strategy pool an
hange over time. Otherwise the bits in the pool of strate-
gies remain the same. We observe that the urves tend
to move downwards from around 0.5 towards zero, whih
means that as the time evolves, the orrelation amongst
the strategies inreases and the strategies in the pool of a
partiular agent onverges towards one strategy. The na-
ture of the urves depend a lot on the parameters of the
game. In Fig. 5 (b) one an see the evolution of the aver-
age Hamming distane of all the strategies of a player in
the game, where the player adapts using hybridized ge-
neti rossover and the two worst strategies are replaed
by the hildren and the parents are also saved. Here too,
the strategies in the pool of a partiular agent onverges
towards one strategy, and at a faster rate than with the
previous mehanism. We observe that inreasing memory
M does not hange dramatially the onvergene rate,
but as we inrease the number of strategies in the pools,
the onvergene slows down.
In order to investigate what happens in the level of an
individual agent, we reated a ompetitive surrounding
test situation where after T = 3120 time-steps, six play-
Figure 4: Plots of the saled utilities of the four dierent
mehanisms in omparison with that of the basi minority
game. Eah urve represents an ensemble average over 100
runs and eah point in a urve is a time average over a bin
of length 50 time-steps. In the inset, the quantity (1− U) is
plotted against saled time in the double logarithmi sale.
Simulations are done with N = 801, M = 6, k = 16, t = 40,
n = 0.4 and T = 20000.
ers begin to adapt and modify their strategies suh that
three are using hybridized geneti rossover mehanism
and the other three one point geneti rossover, where
hildren replae the parents. The rest of the players play
the basi minority game. In this ase it turns out that
in the end the best players are those who use the hy-
bridized mehanism, seond best are those using the one-
point mehanism, and the bad players those who do not
adapt at all. In addition it turns out that the ompeti-
tion amongst the players who adapt using the hybridized
geneti rossover mehanism is severe.
IV. CONCLUSION
We an summarize our ndings by stating that adap-
tation improves not only the individual player's perfor-
mane but also improves the total utility of the system.
The best results are found for the players who adapt
and modify their strategies using the hybridized geneti
rossover mehanism and the hildren replae the two
worst strategies and the parents are saved. The meh-
anism of adaptation is very simple and an be used to
model dierent omplex adaptive systems. It an also be
potentially developed to inlude other features like mu-
tation. We an thus say that in a way, biology helps you
to win a game.
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Figure 5: Plot of the average Hamming distane of all
the strategies in a pool of a player with time, where the
player adapts using (a) one-point geneti rossover and (b)
hybridized geneti rossover, and in both ases the two worst
strategies are replaed by the hildren and the parents are
also saved. Eah urve is an ensemble average over 20 runs.
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Figure 6: Plot of the performane of the players where after
T = 3120 time-steps, six players begin to adapt and mod-
ify their strategies: three using hybridized geneti rossover
mehanism and the other three using one point geneti
rossover, where hildren replae the parents. Other players
play the basi minority game all the time and do not adapt.
The simulations are done with N = 801, M = 8, k = 16,
n = 0.3, t = 80, and T = 10000.
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